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ABSTRACT
The paper presents a dialogue between contemporary phenomenology 
and Plato on the nature and complexity of pain. Taking as a departure point 
Drew Leder’s “The experiential paradoxes of pain” the article delves into 
the essentially liminal character of pain. It focusses afterwards in two pa-
radoxes that these experiences reveal. The first one is the one that describes 
the pain as a sensation and also as an interpretation. The second is the one 
that describes the pain as a destructive but also productive experience. We 
discuss throughout the article how the Platonic approach, although being 
much more holistic (in the sense of always combining the personal, ethical, 
political, and cosmological perspective), is not far from the phenomenologi-
cal one. And we conclude that both methods try to limit and to describe an 
experience that escapes all limitations and determinations.
Key words: pain; pleasure; phenomenology; intentionality; paradox; apei-
ron; Plato.
RESUMEN
El artículo presenta un diálogo entre la fenomenología contemporánea 
y Platón sobre la naturaleza complejidad del dolor. Tomando como punto 
de partida el artículo de D. Leder “Las paradojas experienciales del dolor”, 
el escrito profundiza en el carácter esencialmente liminal del dolor y luego 
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se centra en dos paradojas que revela esta experiencia. La primera es la que 
describe el dolor como una sensación y también como una interpretación; 
la segunda es el que lo describe como una experiencia destructiva y también 
productiva. A lo largo del artículo veremos que el enfoque platónico, aunque 
sea mucho más holístico (en el sentido de combinar siempre la perspectiva 
personal, ética, política y también cosmológica), no está muy lejos de la feno-
menológica. Que ambos enfoques intentan establecer límites y describir una 
experiencia que escapa a todas las limitaciones y determinaciones.
Palabras clave: dolor; placer; fenomenología; intencionalidad; paradoja; 
apeiron; Platón.
This paper aims to present a dialogue between contemporary phenome-
nology and the Greek tradition, represented by Plato, on the nature and com-
plexity of the experience of pain. To do that, we depart from Drew Leder’s 
exposition of different pain paradoxes in his article “The experiential para-
doxes of pain” (Leder, 2016). The present paper aims at enriching Leder’s 
description reviewing the common places between the phenomenological 
approach and the Platonic treatment of pain. We begin this exposition by 
comparing the general idea of pain understood as a liminal or paradoxical ex-
perience to deal, afterwards, with two of the paradoxes included in Leader’s 
work. The first paradox is the one that describes the pain as a sensation and 
as an interpretation; that is, as a raw material from the senses and as an ex-
perience attached to an interpretation or a representation. The second is the 
one that describes the pain as a destructive or disruptive element for our 
experience and, at the same time, as a productive experience, meaning that 
from the experience of pain, some meaning or understanding can be built or 
learnt1.
Before starting the dialogue between the Greek tradition represented by 
Plato and contemporary phenomenology, at least two elements need to be 
pointed out. Firstly, in the Platonic sources and the Greek culture in gene-
ral, pain always appears as being inseparable from pleasure and generally 
understood as its opposite. This inseparability is established in the Republic 
(583b and ff.) or the Philebus (31b and ff.), and presented, for instance, in the 
1. The other paradoxes that Leder explains are: “certainty and uncertainty” “the 
present and the projective”, “the never-changing and the ever-changing”, “the mind and 
body”, “self and other”, “the here and everywhere”, “the in-control and out-of-control” 
(Leder, 2016).
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dramatic scene of the Phaedo, where Socrates states, about pleasure and pain, 
that “anybody that pursues one of them and catches it, he’s always pretty 
well bound to catch the other as well” (60b-c). The opposition between pain 
and pleasure seems to be connected with the idea of harmony, because both 
experiences are part, as we will see, of a process of constitution, disintegra-
tion or restitution of a certain harmony or natural state. The platonic source 
usually defends this opposition together with the idea of the existence of an 
intermediate state, which is neither pleasure nor pain (Philebus, 33b, and ff.) 
and, finally, with the idea that both experiences are forms of movement (Re-
public, 584e and ff.). From the phenomenological perspective, where notions 
like harmony (and especially in the sense of cosmic or metaphysical har-
mony) usually are absent, there is no explicit agreement about the opposition 
between pleasure and pain. Some approaches may treat them as opposites, 
like the one represented by Max Scheler (1913-16: 2000) or David Le Bre-
ton (2003), whereas in the most of the cases they are treated separately and 
understood as separate experiences (Buijtendijk, 1948; 1961; Scarry, 1985; 
Serrano de Haro, 2012a). The possibility of detaching these two experiences 
remains an important subject, but we cannot deal with it here.
Secondly, while for contemporary phenomenology and in general for mo-
dern thought and science, the central interest is located on pain (frequently 
detached from pleasure). For Plato and the Greek tradition, the primary in-
terest is in the study of pleasure. These elements are quite surprising, given 
the fact that generally speaking, our society and life tend to be hedonistic. In 
contrast, ancient Greeks are thought to have lived a rather harsh and often 
not pleasurable life full of war, sufferings, and destruction. This fact could 
be, again, an intriguing subject for discussion, but we cannot go into it now.
The two aspects mentioned above, the higher centrality of pleasure over 
pain and the permanent connection between both experiences, determine a 
relevant point of our approach when we deal with the Platonic source. On 
many occasions, our statements about pain are not directly taken from the 
argument of the dialogues, but rather extrapolated from the discussion of 
pleasure. The reason for doing so is that, in most of the cases, Plato replaces 
clarifications on suffering by the more common clarification about pleasure.
As for the Platonic sources used in this paper, they are circumscribed to 
the discussion on pleasure and pain that we find in the Republic (583a-587d), 
the Timaeus (64a2-65b3) and the Philebus (31b-55c). The most careful stu-
dy conducted in this field, still very unexplored, is the one by David Co-
nan Wolfsdorf, who offers a vibrant analysis of the Timaeus’s description of 
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pain, also referring to the clarifications of the Republic and the Philebus (cf. 
Wolfsdorf, 2015). Also, the fascinating study by Mathew Evans (2007), from 
a more analytical perspective, finds the connections between the Philebus 
and the modern conception of pain as attached to representational content. 
Finally, the classic work of Gosling and Taylor (1982) also remains a valua-
ble reference, although their approach focuses mainly on the experience of 
pleasure.
1. The liminal, paradoxical or apeironic characTer 
of The experience of pain
The general idea that governs Leder’s diagnosis of the contemporary phe-
nomenological approach to pain and the idea that serves him to introduce the 
different paradoxes is the fact that this experience has a liminal or paradoxi-
cal character. This means that pain is an experience located in the in-between, 
in an indeterminate sphere between the body and the mind, between the im-
mediate experience and the mediation of rationality and judgment. Pain, as 
Leder puts it, “inhabits an in-between state, a kind of nether region characte-
rized by “ambiguity, paradox, a confusion of all the customary categories””. 
(Leder, 2016, 458-459). This ambiguity can be seen by observing one of the 
most commonly used definitions of pain, the one offered by the IASP, where 
the pain is located between a sensation and an emotion and is, at the same 
time, associated, but not reduced to, a physical experience: “An unpleasant 
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue 
damage, or described in terms of such damage” (International Association 
for the Study of Pain, 2005). As Grüny (2004, 16) points out, this definition 
leaves open, as well as mixes, the clarification of notions like “unpleasant”, 
“sensation” “emotio”, or “tissue damage”.
The liminal or paradoxical aspect of pain finds a clear and astonishing 
parallel in the work of Plato. As Socrates states in the Philebus:
pains and pleasures come to be set alongside one another simultaneously, 
and, as it just now came to light, of these contraries [pleasure and pain] sensa-
tions [ ] simultaneously arise relative to one another […] both of this 
pair, pain, and pleasure, receive the more and the less [ ], 
and as a pair, they belong to the unlimited [ ] things (Plato, Philebus, 
41d1-8; trans. S. Benardete).
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That pain is an apeira, an unlimited or indeterminate reality, means that it 
belongs to the class of things that have the nature of the “more and the less” 
of all those realities that are always in flux, like the hotter and the colder or, 
the bigger and the smaller:
…in the case of the hotter and the colder, see whether you could ever 
conceive of some limit, or would the more and the less, which dwell as a pair 
of them, as long as the pair is dwelling within, disallow to the genera an end 
and completion to come to be, for when an ending occurs, the pair of them 
also has come to an end (Plato, Philebus, 24a-b)2.
It is important to stress here, as this represents an essential difference 
with the phenomenological approach, that the undetermined character of 
pain (and pleasure) is not only seen by Plato from the perspective of the 
human experience (or, in other words, from the first-person perspective that 
phenomenology tends to use) but also, and in an extreme sense, from a ho-
listic or global perspective, a standpoint including a cosmological, ethical 
and even political view. This is made clear in the description of the cosmos 
as a whole constituted by four classes or types: the limit, the unlimited, the 
mixture between them, and the cause of the mixture. As Socrates states in a 
specific moment of the dialogue, “there are –it’s what we have often said– an 
extensive unlimited in the whole and a satisfactory limit, and no inferior and 
shallow cause is presiding over them, ordering and arranging years, seasons, 
and months, and it is to be spoken of most justly as wisdom and mind” (Pla-
to, Philebus, 30c1-6).
That means that pain and pleasure, as undetermined realities, share a si-
milar nature with the unlimited in the whole (that is, of the unlimited as a 
constitutive part of the cosmic reality); the difference being that in the cos-
mic level the unlimitedness can be limited, measured or controlled thanks to 
the cosmic order or rationality (such as when, from the flux between hot and 
cold, the different seasons are created; cf. Philebus, 26b-c); while in the hu-
man dimension, the limit or the measure needs to be imposed by our human 
rationality and will, much weaker and much less effective than the cosmic 
nous. The Platonic attempt to introduce this limit and measure has a clear 
ethical and political intention in the fulfilment of a good life in the individual 
2. See Aristotle and his references to the “diad” (“ ”) or to and “the more and the less” 
(“ ”) in Metaphysics (988a5-10;1081a-1082b) or Physics (192a6-25).
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and the communitarian sense, an intention that is (or at least seems to be) 
absent in any phenomenological approach.
Despite all the differences in the way of approaching the question of pain 
as an unlimited experience or as a paradoxical experience, both the Platonic 
dialogue and the phenomenological approach, try to offer tools and strate-
gies to describe the indescribable, to set a limit to the unlimited. As Serrano 
de Haro puts it, there is a need to go beyond the lived condition of pain 
toward “a categorical or, if you prefer, an ontological discussion […] because 
pain occupies this purely frontier place, it is a kind of juncture located expe-
rience, that makes it perhaps the most bodily of the events of consciousness 
and at the same time the most conscious of the bodily phenomena” (Serrano 
de Haro, 2008, 87-88).
2. pain as a mere sensaTion or as an inTerpreTaTion
The first paradox which we deal with is the one described by Leder as 
“Sensation and Interpretation” a paradox concerned with the difficulty of 
determining whether the pain is a mere sensation without any intentional or 
representational character, or if it is something non-detachable from an in-
terpretation or a representation. As Toombs (1992, 36–37) puts it, “pain thus 
partakes both in the immediacy of sensation and in the mediacy of complex 
referentiality and interpretation” For its relevance to understand the com-
plexity of the experience of pain, this seems to be the most essential or pri-
mary of the paradoxes, at least from the phenomenological perspective; and 
this is so because the intentional character of pain furnishes it with an entity, 
with an ontological dimension, an entity that may get lost if we understand 
this experience to be a mere sensation or a non-intentional experience. Let’s 
approach these two possibilities in some detail.
2.1. Pain as a mere sensation, or the common position 
of Protarchus and Husserl
On the one hand, pain can be seen as a mere or immediate sensation, which 
implies a comprehension of pain as raw reception of a stimulus, without any 
intentional content. To say that pain is a mere sensation means that we do 
not feel pain “of” or “for” something, but we just feel pain. As Elaine Sca-
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rry (1985, 161-162) states, pain, because of this lack of any referential con-
tent, is almost impossible to be rendered in language. Originally, the non-
intentional character of pain has been defended by two of the most eminent 
phenomenologist, Carl Stumpf, and Edmund Husserl. He is in this aspect in 
confrontation with their master Franz Brentano. Stumpf and Husserl consi-
der that physical pain is not a perception or something that happens in one’s 
body, and neither exclusively a mere sensation, that is the reason why they 
use the term “effective sensation” (“Gefühlempfindung”) to describe it3.
In the Platonic context, this position is quite similar to the one defended 
by Protarchus and Philebus, who deny any possibility of introducing inter-
nal differences or determinations in the experience of pain as Socrates states 
referring to the value of pleasure and suffering for the two young hedonists, 
“although the majority of them are bad and there are good ones as well, 
as we assert, all the same, you address them all as good” (Plato, Philebus, 
13b1-3). All pleasures and all pains, no matter the context, the representation 
content attached to them, are good and positive in the case of pleasure, both 
bad and negative in the case of pain4. As the dialogue shows, this means that 
independently of the intentional o representation character of the experience 
of pleasure and pain, these experiences are not affected in their essence qua 
pleasures and pains. Their reality is, in this sense, not intentional or repre-
sentational. As we see later, the reality of pain and pleasure is essential, it’s 
factuality, devoid of any characterization, that’s why “we speak –says Pro-
tarchus– of the opinion as false at that time, but no one would ever address 
the pleasure itself as false (Plato, Philebus, 38a2-3)”.
To fully understand this position, we need first to clarify what it means 
for an experience to be intentional. Intentionality indicates directedness or 
tension of the experience. It can be defined as “the power of minds to be 
about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs” 
(Standford Dictionary). It represents a temporal connection between so-
mething which is subjective or has to do with my own (first person) pers-
pective (the pole of “subjective” experience that we could call A), and an ex-
ternal element which is determined (the pole referenced to the object, which 
we call B). Intentionality implies too that the relationship between A and 
3. For a detailed clarification of these positions, see Serrano de Haro (2010).
4. Precisely of the same opinion seems to be Aristippus of Cyrene when he states 
that “Pleasure is good even if it proceeds from the most unseemly conduct” (Diogenes 
Laertius, II, 86).
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B has a temporal nature, a temporality that allows the experience itself. For 
example, by seeing, I intentionally see a computer in front of me, determi-
ning its form and shape; by touching, I intentionally and kinesthetically get 
information from the keyboard that I use to write these words, an experience 
which points towards something external to the touching itself. Intentiona-
lity always implies an externalization of experiences, the fact that I am, that 
my experience is, directed towards the object of my experience. This is the 
meaning of technical notions like ‘composition,’ ‘construction’ or ‘horizon’ 
of the experience5.
To say that pain is not an intentional experience means, then, that this 
experience somehow abolishes or destroys the distinction between the poles 
of the intentional experience A and B. It is as if the pain would compress or 
squash the two poles, somehow fusing them and turning them into a mere 
sensation or, as Stumpt and Husserl defend, an “affective sensation” impe-
ding in this way the experience to be intentional. Whereas the composition, 
as a result of the intentional experience, represents, as we have said before, a 
kind of being always moved towards something external, the destruction of 
this composition by pain implies rather a type of closure. This internal expe-
rience does not have, from itself, any reference to anything external. As Se-
rrano de Haro states, “in physical suffering, perceptive and bodily sensibility, 
which is normally opened to the world, reverts inward, flows back, without 
any intentional exit, without a transitive vector to anything else, enclosed in a 
possibly unexpected revelation of itself” (Serrano de Haro, 2012b, 232).
5. “Husserl’s thoughts on the phenomenological reduction, on temporality, on per-
ception, on evidence, can all be integrated into a coherent pattern if we study them in 
their rapport with the concept of constitution. Furthermore, the concept of constitution 
is used by Husserl as an explanatory schema: in giving the constitution of an object, 
Husserl feels he is giving the philosophical explanation of such an object. Thus in our 
discussion of constitution, we are studying the explanatory power of phenomenology, 
and in relating other phenomenological concepts to the concept of constitution, we are 
studying what they contribute to the philosophical explanation that phenomenology at-
tempts to furnish” (Sokolowski, R., (1970) The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Cons-
titution).
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2.2. Pain as an intentional experience or the common position 
of Socrates and Brentano
On the other side of this first paradox, pain can be seen precisely as an 
intentional experience, as an experience which is not detachable from (and 
that can be even identified with) an interpretation or with some kind of re-
presentational content6. This intentional understanding of pain can be seen 
from different perspectives and in different contexts. Still, perhaps one of 
the clearest is the medical one, where the patients or the sufferers experience 
that “with each new interpretive perspective, the sensed pain itself changed 
in quality, intensity, meaning, and affective content” (Leder, 2016, 446). As 
Leder defends in his article, this paradox is somehow supported by modern 
neuroscience, since from this perspective, pain is an experience where sensi-
tive, affective, and cognitive aspects are integrated (cf. Melzack & Wall, 1991, 
191). Initially, the intentional or content-bearing aspect of pain has been de-
fended by the master of Husserl and Stump, Brentano, who considers pain 
to be similar to sadness or joy, experiences that always implies a representa-
tional or an objectifying act; in this sense, pain “is the intentional correlate 
of a sense-perception and of a concomitant feeling; and so the pain does 
lie in one’s toe, not in one’s consciousness, not in mind, not in the brain” 
(Serrano de Haro, 2010, 388). Pain, expressed from the Platonic viewpoint, 
can be somehow determined, limited, or classified. This is again the position 
defended, mutatis mutandis, by Socrates, who not only identifies internal 
differences inside of pain and pleasure but also associates –as we discuss in 
the following lines– the structure of these experiences with the structure of 
judgment (Philebus, 36c-38c).
Going back to a previous point, to consider pain an intentional experience 
means that this experience is directed or that it stands for something external 
6. It’s important to clarify here the different sense of ‘interpretation’ and ‘represen-
tation,’ a term that Leder is not using to describe the present paradox, but that has for 
us some relevance. The difference between both notions is that whereas interpretation 
focuses clearly in the active character of experience, representation remains in the in-
between, between interpretation and sensation. The reason being that representation has 
a passive role although being more active than a mere sensation; which means that in 
the case of representation, the cognitive element present in pain can be active or passive 
(like when we associate a particular representation to a painful sensation, for instance, in 
which case this cognitive element is not necessarily active). Be it as it may, in both cases, 
there is a determination of the experience of pain in both cases, that is, from the classical 
perspective, some kind of peras, limit or measure.
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to itself; in this sense, through the experience of pain, both poles A (the “sub-
jective” pole) and B (the pole that is directed toward the object) remain se-
parated and united through temporality. Pain is, then, not a simple reception 
of a stimulus, a raw or indeterminate experience, but instead implies some 
degree of determination. This fact, the understanding of pain as belonging to 
the class of experiences that produce, or allow, some kind of determination, 
is of great importance to establish the comparison with the Socratic position 
presented in the Philebus. In seeing pain as something attached to an inter-
pretation, some kind of determination (peras) is introduced into the origina-
lly unlimited experience of pain (or pleasure):
Socrates: … If we detect some pain, in its involvement with that for which 
[ ] there is pain, in error, or its contrary, pleasure, in error, shall 
we apply “right” or “good” or any of the beautiful names to it? […] it does 
look as if pleasure often comes to be for us, not with the right opinion but 
with falsehood.
Protarchus: Of course, it does. In a situation of that kind, Socrates, we 
speak of the opinion as false at that time, but no one would ever address the 
pleasure itself as false (Plato, Philebus, 37e5-38a3).
The fragment is illustrative of the two positions that we are describing. 
On the one side, Protarchus defends that pain is pain and pleasure is pleasu-
re, they are understood as mere sensations (as a simple hedesthai or lypesthai) 
that do not admit any kind of intrinsic differentiation. Actually, he considers 
pain and pleasure as having an absolute factuality, a factuality that is unqua-
lified as a mere sensation. On the other hand, Socrates, who does not deny 
this factuality, adds to it the possibility to classify and establish internal di-
fferences in the experience of pains and pleasures. The main result of the So-
cratic enquiry is to prove –against the position defended by Protarchus and 
Philebus– that pleasure cannot be simply identified with the good (and pain 
with the bad) and that there is a possible way to introduce measure into the 
naturally unlimited experience of pain and pleasure. To fully understand the 
Socratic position, and these internal distinctions, we need to clarify the rela-
tionship between the notions of harmony, perception, desire, and memory.
The Socratic attempt to classify and to introduce some degree of measure 
into pleasure and pain departs from the idea that this experiences, although 
being in themselves unlimited, are connected or derive from a state of har-
mony, a harmony that represents a general state of equilibrium, a good 
example of which would be health (cf. Plato, Philebus, 31d1-8; cf. Timaeus, 
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64d1-8). Pain is then the experience that may accompany the dissolution of 
this harmony or may also be understood as emptiness felt in the body. In 
all occasions where a state of dissolution or emptiness appears and is percei-
ved, a reaction or a countermovement towards harmony or fulfilment takes 
places, and this is so thanks to the power of desire ( ; cf. Philebus, 
34c-35d). Desire is a power of the soul that moves us toward “conditions op-
posite to the actual ones in the body, while it is the body that undergoes the 
pain and the pleasure of some affection” (cf. Philebus, 41c4-6). The power of 
desire, as the main feature that explains the presence of a structure inside the 
experience of pain and pleasure, is intimately attached to the power of me-
mory ( ) or recollection. It is so because memory supplies the content 
or the direction toward which we should fulfil our emptiness: “By pointing 
out that it is the memory that directs it toward the objects of its desires, our 
argument –states Socrates– has established that every impulse, desire, and 
the rule over the animal is the domain of the soul” (Philebus, 35d1-4). So, 
when there is a destruction of a harmony (actual, imagined or expected) we 
automatically desire the opposite of the present state (felt in the body) and 
memory (or recollection) gives us the content (let us say the object) of this 
desire, a desire that is, in fact, felt as pain or emptiness. As Dorothea Frede 
(1993, 37) says, “the point of this careful analysis of the different factors 
is to establish that pains and pleasures are intentional (object-directed) sta-
tes since all involve memory” Or, as Matthew Evans expresses it, “if pains 
are to play the role in practical reasoning that they manifestly do play, then 
they must have a structure that’s similar to that of familiar content-bearing 
psychological states such as opinion, hope, anger, and the like” (2007, 91). It 
is precisely its connection with desire and memory that allows us to unders-
tand the intentional or representational character of the experience of pain.
The intentional or representational character of pain is introduced in the 
Philebus through the presence, in any pleasurable or painful experience, of a 
judgement or opinion (δόξα; cf. Philebus, 36e7, and ff.) that can modify and 
transform the experience itself. This can be seen in the quote mentioned abo-
ve, where pleasure and pain imply a reference to reality ( : or a  
, cf. 37c2-4) made through a judgement that may be mistaken (ἁμαρτάνω), 
affecting in this way the factual experience of pain. This error or mistake 
from the pains and pleasures is the specific place where the paradox that 
we are dealing with can be placed. For Protarchus, there is no possible mis-
take or error in the experience of pain or pleasure (because these experiences 
don’t accept internal differences), but for Socrates, this error can take three 
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different forms (cf. Philebus, 36c-41a; 41a-42c; 42c-46b). In the Socratic ac-
count, the presence of representations (or misrepresentations) affecting the 
actual experience of pain and pleasure has to do, as we have seen, with the 
relationship between these experiences, perception, memory and desire and 
implies, in fact, not only the complex nature of pain itself but also our whole 
comprehension of the present, the past and the future of our existence. This 
is so because we always tend (through the power of desire) to move toward 
a possible or imaginary fulfilment identified with a representation of what 
we think is right, a representation, or expectation that may be qualified as 
true or false. An interesting difference with the phenomenological approach 
is to be found here: whereas the phenomenological approach may defend the 
existence of an interpretation or a representation (or misrepresentation) as 
modifying the mere sensation of pain, this modification is not understood in 
terms of right and wrong or, much less in term of what is good or bad. This 
has to do with the intention of neutrality of the modern phenomenological 
approach.
Of course, as in the contemporary discussion, the problem as well how 
exactly a judgment (or any form of representation or interpretation attached 
to the factual experience), can affect or modify the actual sensation of pain. 
Leder (2016, 446) points toward a very concrete explanation of this fact, in-
dicating how the interpretation of a particular pain transforms its felt quality 
or intensity. The modification of the degree and intensity of the experience 
of pain as a consequence of an interpretation or expectation that is not part of 
the content of the sensation itself is also underlined by Eric J. Cassel (1982, 
641), who explains how specific interpretations of pain imply a higher degree 
of suffering: “people in pain frequently report suffering from the pain when 
they feel out of control, when the pain is overwhelming, when the source of 
the pain is unknown, when the meaning of the pain is dire, or when the pain 
is chronic.” In a similar sense, Christopher Hill (2005, 95) develops the idea 
of the “substantial amount of misrepresentation” associated with the expe-
rience of pain.
Finally, it is worth noting that the presence of the power of desire or 
eros in the Socratic argument, the power that allows us to understand that 
the essentially irrational experience of pain can find a direction, a solution 
that implies memory and judgement, finds a parallel in the phenomenolo-
gical description through the notion of Erfüllung, the so-called fulfilment 
structure, the fact of filling significant intentions of specific actions through 
an intuitive content. What I take to be a certain way or manner tends to 
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manifest itself in what Husserl calls an experience of fulfilment (Erfüllung); 
an experience where we are aware of the grounds for taking something in a 
certain way, and we are aware that we are rational in virtue of being aware of 
these grounds. That happens, for instance, when the hidden or backside of 
an object that we are observing is how I took it actually to be (Husserl, 1950, 
§§24–27; 1976, §§136–38).
3. The desTrucTive and producTive characTer of pain
Finally, let us discuss the second paradox, the one that Leder calls “the 
productive and destructive” character of pain. This paradox has to do with 
the fact that pain involves a destructive character and a productive or positive 
one. The destructive character of pain has to do with its character as an expe-
rience “overturning all that makes life enjoyable, convivial, purposeful, and 
meaningful” (Leder, 2016, 457; cf. Scarry, 1985, 29). The phenomenologist 
Christian Grüny, in his book Zerstörte Erfahrung. Eine Phänomenologie des 
Schmerzes (Destruction of experience. A phenomenology of pain) defends 
that the irruption of pain is always a disturbance of the experience, a disrup-
tion in the normal activities in everyday life that can be defined as a “blocked 
movement of flight” (eine blockierte Fluchtbewegung) (Grüny, 2004, 118). 
By that, he means that pain, which is essentially a process, a movement, pro-
duces harming negativity that cannot be ignored or deactivated, it can just be 
suffered as it is (Grüny, 2004, 166). The conception of pain as destruction, 
or destitution (or as a crisis of the experience) is intimately connected with 
the idea of composition or intentionality that has been previously clarified. 
If there is a destruction of the experience or the perceived world, that means 
that, somehow, the intentional or representation character of pain precedes 
conceptually and factually its dimension as destruction. Pain, when it is ex-
perienced in our body, impedes and destroys the normality of our existence, 
this is the meaning of the first extreme of the paradox we are dealing with.
On the other hand, pain may contain a positive or productive aspect because 
it may generate new questions and meanings; it may inform us about the existen-
ce of a problem, indicating as well how to solve it; it may awaken a comprehen-
sion of our existence, our actions and, in general, of the sense of life. Effectively, 
pain can generate new questions, and meanings about how I should treat and 
prevent pain in the future, “Hopefully –as Leder states– the messages received 
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are both beneficial and practicable. With proper rest, self-care, exercise, the back 
problem may resolve— lesson learned (Leder, 2016, 457).
If we now move to the Platonic source, we see that description of pain 
contains both a destructive and productive character. As for its destructive 
character, it can be found in the very definition of pain that can be found 
both in the Philebus and the Timaeus. In the first dialogue, pain is associated 
with destruction and, specifically, with violent and sudden destruction of 
a state of harmony; when this harmony is dissolved “in us animals […] the 
simultaneous genesis of pains” takes place, and “when that nature is being 
fitted back together again and is returning to its own nature, we have to 
speak of the coming into being of pleasure” (Plato, Philebus, 31d1-87). A 
very similar idea is expressed in the Timaeus “An impression produced in us 
contrary to nature and violent, if sudden, is painful; and, again, the sudden 
return to nature is pleasant; but a gentle and gradual return is imperceptible 
and vice versa (Plato, Timaeus, 64d1-4; trans. B. Jewett).
In both cases, pain and pleasure appear as forms of movements that are 
opposite to each other concerning a state of harmony, a natural state, or an 
adequate condition (cf. Philebus, 34a3-5; Timaeus, 43c4-7). This natural or 
adequate state has to do with the Platonic conception of φύσις (a notion pro-
bably influenced by the Hippocratic view) that determines the constitution 
of the human body as a harmonious relationship between dynamic elements 
that produce a general unity and stability. This harmony is identified in the 
Philebus with a kind of measured mixture between ἄπειρον and πέρας as 
it is found, for example, in health (cf. 28e8-9), musical rhythms (cf. 26a2-
4), meteorological stability (cf. 26a6-8) and also in beauty and strength (cf. 
26b4-5). There is no pain without the destruction of this harmonic or ade-
quate state and, at the same time, this destruction, to be perceived as pain, 
needs to be violent, because gentle movements always remain unperceived 
(ἀναίσθητος). As Timaeus puts it: “Things which experience gradual with-
drawings and emptyings of their nature, and great and sudden replenish-
ments, fail to perceive the emptying, but are sensible of the replenishment; 
and so, they occasion no pain” (Plato, Timaeus. 65a1-7).
The Platonic source also furnishes us with at least two aspects that can be 
seen as productive or constructive in the comprehension of pain. The full de-
velopment of each of these aspects would exceed the extension of this paper 
by far; that’s why we only describe them shortly. The first sense into which 
7. Cf. Merker (2004, 15-16).
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pain can be seen as a productive experience has to do with the representatio-
nal or content-bearing aspect of it as explained before; every painful expe-
rience implies the presence of certain kind of judgement that may be correct 
or incorrect, and that represents or reflects (being in this sense informative 
about) some aspect of reality. The second aspect is the educational or politi-
cal relevance of pains and pleasures, the fact that for Plato, these experiences 
need to be shaped in conformity with a particular idea of what is right and 
what is wrong for the community. That is why everybody, and especially the 
child, needs to be “rightly trained in respect of pleasures and pains, to hate 
what ought to be hated, right from the beginning up to the very end, and 
to love what ought to be loved” (Plato, Laws, 654b1-c2; trans. R. G. Bury). 
This kind of education is exemplified through athletics or gymnastics (Pla-
to, Timaeus, 89a; Republic, 403c-404e) and also through dance (Plato, Laws, 
653a-654d) (cf. Moutsopoulos, 1989).
The educational dimension of pain could be complemented with its rele-
vance as a form of punishment in its service to ensure and reach the city’s po-
litical order and its souls. Indeed, physical pain is said to be needed to repair 
an injustice (cf. Plato, Gorgias, 525b-c). However, the real punishment is the 
one that is inflicted in the soul of the criminal, mainly through the experience 
of shame (cf. Plato, Laws, 855a-c; 862d-e; 949c-d). As Ann Merker points 
out, the function of the body (through the experience of physical pain) is a 
semantic one; this is so because once it has been punished, our body indica-
tes, through the scars or whatever consequences resulting from the punish-
ment, the state of the soul. In this sense, the body is understood as a sign (as 
a ‘sema’), because through it, “the soul signifies whatever it wants to signify” 
(cf. Plato, Cratilus, 400b-c; trans. C.D.C. Reeve) (cf. Merker, 2004, 42-48).
conclusions: plaTo’s holism vs. phenomenological concreTeness 
in The sTudy of pain
To summarise this comparative exercise, we see that the Platonic approach 
to the experience of pain is much more holistic than the phenomenological 
one. Whereas the latter sees the destructive character of pain mainly as a 
world-destructive experience seen from the first-person perspective (when 
I feel pain my attention is distracted; my relations with the others and the 
world are disrupted, and the like), in the Platonic description this destruction 
is also attached, to a more general notion of harmony and even to the notion 
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of the order of the city and the soul. This general notion of harmony, of a na-
tural state, is clearly absent in the phenomenological approach, possibly due 
to the fact from the modern view, nature is seen as somehow detached from 
human nature. From our point of view, this fact has essential consequences 
in the way we understand (and experience), both pain and pleasure.
The Platonic way of dealing with pleasure and pain, although including a 
phenomenology of the first-person experience, never stops there, but it con-
tinuously aims to encourage a change in the attitude of the listener, revealing 
what is good and bad at the personal, ontological and also political and edu-
cational level. Whereas the phenomenological approach always addresses the 
clarification of the first-person experience to complete –and maybe even la-
ying the foundation for– the naturalistic and the constructivist or historicist 
perspective8. Nevertheless, as Geniusas points out, many of the contempo-
rary philosophical attempts to describe pain tend to see it from a physiologi-
cal perspective, from what he calls a physicalist ontology, because “they aim 
to show that pain, just as other bodily sensations, has an object, and that this 
object has a reserved place within a physicalistic ontology” (Geniusas, 2013, 
2). In both cases, the objective is to find the unity of a complex and parado-
xical experience presented in manifold ways and forms in our everyday lives.
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